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1 ‘‘Ich bin das, was ich scheine, und scheine das ni
E.T.A. Hoffmann, ‘‘Die Elixiere des Teufels”a b s t r a c t
Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the impor-
tance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group
of disorders – illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body – has been proposed
to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical
considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing
that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the
three aspects: self-location, ﬁrst-person perspective, and self-location, is crucial for bodily
self-consciousness. Here we present clinical and neuroanatomical data of two neurological
patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation in whom only one of these
aspects, self-identiﬁcation, was abnormal. We distinguish such disorders of global body
representation from related but distinct disorders and discuss their relevance for the neu-
robiology of bodily self-consciousness.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.‘‘I am what I seem to be, yet do not seem to be what I am; even to myself I am an insoluble riddle, for my personality has been
torn apart!”1
E.T.A. Hoffmann, ‘‘The Devil’s Elixirs”1. Introduction
Unraveling the neural basis of self-consciousness is a major research topic in the cognitive neurosciences and science
at large. One line of research has focused on the contributions of bodily processing and body representation to self-
consciousness (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Craig, 2002; Damasio, 1999; Jeannerod, 2007). Behavioral work in healthy
subjects has studied multisensory (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2007) and sensorimotor (Blakemore & Frith, 2003;
Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998) aspects of self-consciousness by revealing some of
the mechanisms of how bodily processing inﬂuences self-consciousness. Neuroimaging studies in healthy subjects have. All rights reserved.
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anisms – including interoceptive and cognitive aspects of self-consciousness temporo-parietal junction, insula precuneus,
and medial prefrontal cortex (for reviews see Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Craig, 2002; Northoff et al., 2006; Vogeley & Fink,
2003).
Historically, however, it was the detailed clinical reports of neurological and psychiatric patients suffering from disorders
of body representation, and illusory own body perceptions (Critchley, 1953; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Ionasescu, 1960;
Lhermitte, 1939; Sierra, Lopera, Lambert, Phillips, & David, 2002), which have suggested close links between bodily process-
ing and self-consciousness for a long time. This clinical work highlighted the importance of multisensory bodily processing in
patients suffering from migraine (Lippman, 1952; Podoll & Robinson, 1999; Todd, 1955), vascular stroke (Critchley, 1953),
tumors (Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Sierra et al., 2002), epilepsy (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004; Blanke, Ortigue,
Coeytaux, Martory, & Landis, 2003), and psychiatric disorders (Lukianowicz, 1963).
Such disorders of body representation2 have been classiﬁed as a variety of alterations in perceptual bodily experience such
as the experiences of the absence of a body part (Critchley, 1953; Frederiks, 1969; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952), body part
transformations (Critchley, 1953; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Ionasescu, 1960; Lippman, 1952), body part displacement
(Lippman, 1952; Nightingale, 1982), disconnection of one body part from the body (Blanke et al., 2003; Lippman, 1952), the
delusional misidentiﬁcation of one’s own body part (i.e. somatoparaphrenia) (Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009), as well
as phantom limbs (Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Lhermitte, 1939), and supernumerary phantom limbs (Khateb et al., 2009;
Vuilleumier, Reverdin & Landis, 1997) (for reviews see (Blanke, Arzy, & Landis, 2008; Brugger, 2006; Dieguez, Staub, &
Bogousslavsky, 2007; Frederiks, 1969; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935). The brain damage leading
to these disorders of body representation suggested a predominant involvement of the right posterior parietal cortex and ipsile-
sional subcortical regions, although other areas were also found to be implicated, i.e. the lateral prefrontal and premotor cortex
(Arzy, Overney, Landis, & Blanke, 2006; Berti et al., 2005; Critchley, 1953; Dieguez et al., 2007; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952) and
the right posterior insular cortex (Baier & Karnath, 2008).
Extending earlier accounts (Brugger, 2002, 2006; Devinsky, Feldmann, Burrowes, & Bromﬁeld, 1989; Grüsser & Landis,
1991; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Mizumoto & Ishikawa, 2005), we have recently proposed
that a well-deﬁned group of disorders of body representation – illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body (or
primarily the head and trunk region) – are especially relevant for the study of bodily self-consciousness (Blanke, 2004;
Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). We highlighted this importance by opposing such illusory own body perceptions with those
affecting an isolated extremity or body part and have based this on neurological and neurophysiological data as well as
philosophical arguments. Based on clinical data, several research groups have recently developed methods to study the
mechanisms of full-body processing and its relationship to self-consciousness experimentally in healthy subjects (Altschuler
& Ramachandran, 2007; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; Mizumoto & Ishikawa, 2005). These
experimental and clinical data jointly suggest that the integration of visual and multisensory bodily signals from the entire
body is important for three major aspects of bodily self-consciousness: self-location (SL; the volume in space where humans
experience the self to be located [‘‘where I experience to be‘‘]), ﬁrst-person perspective (1PP; the directedness of conscious
experience [‘‘where I experience to perceive the world from”]) and self-identiﬁcation (SI; the degree to which humans iden-
tify with their body [‘‘what I experience as my body”]). SL, 1PP, and SI are abnormal in patients with global illusory own body
perceptions (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).
Here we present clinical and anatomical data from two epileptic patients suffering from rare illusory own body percep-
tions associated with abnormal SI and involving predominantly the trunk and head, due to damage to right posterior
dorso-medial parietal cortex (patient 1) and the right dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (patient 2). We discuss the phenome-
nology, etiology, and lesion location in these two cases in regard to the neurological literature and the larger ﬁeld of the
cognitive neuroscience of bodily self-consciousness.
2. Methods
Both patients were recruited at the University Hospital of Geneva, where they underwent full diagnostic workup, includ-
ing a standardized neurological, psychiatric and neuropsychological examination (Pegna, Qayoom, Gericke, Landis, & Seeck,
1998), electroencephalography (EEG, including source imaging of interictal epileptic spikes, Grave de Peralta Menendez,
Gonzalez Andino, Lantz, Michel, & Landis, 2001; Lantz, Grave de Peralta Menendez, Gonzalez Andino, & Michel, 2001; Michel
et al., 2004), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and positron emission tomography (PET). Patient 2 in addition underwent
invasive presurgical evaluations at the Swiss Epilepsy Center in Zurich. Epilepsy surgery of patient 2 was performed at the
Department of Neurosurgery at the University Hospital of Zurich.
In both patients we conducted a semi-structured interview focusing on aspects of bodily self-consciousness, such as 1PP,
SL, SI, as well as somatosensory, visual, auditory, and vestibular symptoms and emotions (following Blanke & Mohr, 2005).
Additionally patient 2 was asked to complete the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) (Sierra & Berrios, 2000). The CDS
comprises 29-items inquiring about subjective experiences classically associated with the depersonalization syndrome.2 Due to the poor deﬁnition of the term body schema (as well as the related term body image) and even more importantly its inconsistent use in the
neurological literature, we decided to use the more neutral term body representation (see de Vignemont, 2010).
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sonalization disorder is 70).
3. Results
3.1. Patient 1
Patient 1 is a 55 year old, left-handed male patient suffering from epilepsy since the age of 14 years. His simple partial
sensorimotor seizures affected his left hand had been well controlled under anti-epileptic medication until the onset of
paroxysmal episodes of vertigo 9 years before the current hospitalization. At that time he additionally started to experience
the following, highly stereotypical pattern of symptoms: without any prior warning he would ﬁrst have the impression of
an increasing pressure in the entire left hemi-body. This sensation increased progressively in strength leading eventually to
the sensation that he was invaded by a stranger in his left hemi-body. At this time he also sensed that the left half of his head,
the upper part of his left trunk, his left arm and his left legwere no longer belonging to him (nomisattribution), that these parts
were disconnected from the rest of his body, and that his body was divided into two parts (Fig. 1A). Sometimes this was fol-
lowed by the impression that the left armwasmoving unintentionally and would disappear behind the patient’s back. During
these episodes he never experienced any deformation or other changes of his body or the environment. Furthermore, no auto-
scopic hallucinations, no sensation of ﬂoating or disembodiment, no change in visuo-spatial or ﬁrst-person perspective, no dis-
turbance of language or vision and no loss of contact or consciousness were noted. During these sensations the patient
localized the self as within the right side of his body (shown in grey in Fig. 1). He managed to remain calm and was able to
continue standing, walking, and even give oral presentations while in front of audiences at work (surrounding persons usually
did not notice his seizure manifestations). These simple partial seizures occurred on a daily basis and lasted 1 min.
Neurological, psychiatric, and neuropsychological examinations were normal. Surface EEG at the time of hospitalization
did not reveal any pathological correlates. MRI showed a hypo-dense lesion in the right posterior intraparietal sulcus
predominantly in the medial wall in the T1 weighted sequence (Fig. 2), which was conﬁrmed by ﬂuid-attenuated inverse
recovery (FLAIR) and PET compatible with arteriovenous malformation. The diagnosis of epileptic seizures was retained,Fig. 1. Phenomenology patient 1. Simple partial seizures were characterized by the impression of increasing pressure in the entire left hemi-body. This
sensation increased progressively in strength leading eventually to the sensation that he was invaded by a stranger in his left hemi-body. At this time he
also sensed that the left half of his head, the upper part of his left trunk, his left arm and his left leg were no longer belonging to him, that these parts were
disconnected from the rest of his body, and that his body was divided into two parts.
Fig. 2. MRI patient 1. T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging reveals a hypointense cortical and subcortical lesion in the right posterior intraparietal
sulcus (arrows), consistent with an arteriovenous malformation. (A) Axial view, (B) 3-D reconstruction. The hypointense lesion is indicated by an arrow.
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eralized seizures as a child), the current symptomatology, and the corresponding neocortical lesion location.
3.2. Patient 2
Patient 2 is a 30 year old, left-handed male patient suffering from pharmaco-resistant epilepsy. He was referred to the
presurgical epilepsy unit at the University Hospital of Geneva and the Epilepsy Clinic in Zurich for further evaluation.Fig. 3. Phenomenology patient 2. Complex partial seizures were characterized by altered bodily awareness including a total loss or a strongly diminished
awareness of bodily signals, which predominated at the lower trunk and legs and also included – to a lesser degree – his upper trunk and neck (black; the
patient could not indicate whether the upper extremities were affected or not, illustrated by dashed black and grey lines). This was accompanied by the
impression that everything below his neck was ‘‘numb”, ‘‘useless” and somewhat inaccessible to conscious awareness while the experience of his head
region was experienced as light and as detached from the rest of his lower body (light grey).
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awareness. During these episodes he felt a total loss or a strongly diminished awareness of his body (that he compared to
numbness). This sensation was localized and predominated at the legs and lower trunk and also included – to a lesser degree
– his upper trunk and neck (the patient could not indicate whether the upper extremities were affected or not (Fig. 3). This
altered bodily awareness progressively increased in strength and eventually led to the impression that everything below his
neck was ‘‘numb”, ‘‘useless” and somewhat inaccessible to conscious awareness whereas the perception of his head re-
mained unaffected and was even experienced as light and as detached from the rest of his lower body. Following this, he
described that he felt ‘‘as an observer of his body and as the one being observed” at the same time. However, he never expe-
rienced ﬂoating, elevation, or vestibular sensations, nor a change in visuo-spatial or ﬁrst-person perspective, and he never
felt physically disembodied (as is typically mentioned in out-of-body experiences; (Blanke et al., 2004; Brugger, Regard, &
Landis, 1997; Devinsky et al., 1989) nor saw an image of himself in external space (autoscopy; i.e. (Blanke et al., 2004;
Brugger et al., 1997).
The patient also noted a feeling of disconnection from his own thoughts and past, and that he was no longer in control of
his actions and speech, like being a robot. In addition the patient often felt as if being detached from the environment, as if
sounds and voices were being transformed and distant, perceived as if ‘‘through a veil”. These sensations were mostly
observed as isolated auras but also could indicate the imminent onset of a complex partial seizure with involuntary move-
ments of the left arm, head deviation to the left, loss of consciousness, and secondary tonic-clonic generalization. The fre-
quency of these auras was variable, ranging from one per day to one per hour and most often occurred during phases of
relaxation. The duration was estimated as 30 s. Different anti-epileptic drugs were tried without any success. Family his-
tory and personal history were negative for epilepsy or psychiatric disease.
Neurological and psychiatric examinations were unremarkable. The interictal neuropsychological evaluation showed
executive and attentional deﬁcits: high distractibility and intrusive thoughts, as well as mild impairments in mental ﬂexi-
bility. The CDS yielded a score of 46. Ictal and interictal high resolution EEG recordings (128 channels) revealed right frontal
and fronto-temporal spikes, spike-waves, and sharp waves and subsequent source imaging of epileptic spikes (Grave de
Peralta Menendez et al., 2001; Lantz et al., 2001; Michel et al., 2004) suggested an epileptogenic focus in the right middle
and superior frontal gyrus (Fig. 4A). Single photon emission tomography (SPECT) demonstrated a hyper-perfusion of the
right middle frontal gyrus, the right anterior cingulate cortex, and the bilateral operculum. Repeated MRI did not show
any lesion, but intracranial EEG recordings and functional mapping using 52 surgically implanted subdural grid electrodes
revealed an epileptogenic focus in the right supplementary motor area (SMA) and the right superior frontal gyrus (Fig. 4B).
Subsequent complete resection of the right SMA and partial resection of the right superior frontal gyrus resulted in partial
seizure control. There were no more seizures during the day and signiﬁcantly fewer seizures during sleep. No more auras
have been described since this ﬁrst operation (15 months follow-up). Meanwhile, this ﬁrst topectomy has been extended
during a second epilepsy surgical procedure, after which no seizures have recurred yet (4 month follow-up).Fig. 4. A. Interictal Spike Mapping. Interictal Spike Mapping with 256-channel EEG in patient 2 and source imaging of epileptic spikes suggested an
epileptogenic focus in the right middle and superior frontal gyrus. The signiﬁcant voxels at a p < 0.01 threshold (corrected for multiple comparisons, e.g. for
the number of electrodes using Bonferroni correction) are indicated in green. The maximum of the estimated source of the averaged interictal spike is
indicated in red (Lantz et al., 2001). B. Intracranial EEG and functional mapping. Intracranial EEG recordings and functional mapping using 52 surgically
implanted subdural grid electrodes revealed an epileptogenic focus in the right supplementary motor area (SMA) and the right superior frontal gyrus (these
electrodes are indicated in red). Subsequent partial resection of the right superior frontal gyrus and the SMA resulted in partial seizure control
(postoperative lesion indicated in red). After a second operation extending the topectomy no seizures have recurred yet. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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We present two patients suffering from non-visual illusory own body perceptions due to epilepsy that affected the
head-trunk region of the body and were accompanied by a disturbance of SI with the body. Patient 1 suffered from abnormal
own body perceptions restricted to his left contralesional hemi-body including the head that was experienced as strange, as
if invaded by a stranger, and as if disconnected from his right ipsilesional hemi-face and -body. Patient 2 reported abnormal
own body perceptions for the trunk, neck, and the legs bilaterally (but not the head), which were experienced as weaker and
numb and as if disconnected from the head. In both patients these illusory own body perceptions were caused by neocortical
epilepsy involving two dorso-medial brain regions that have been linked to self-related processing by recent cognitive
neuroscience work in healthy subjects. Here, we (1) distinguish such rare illusory own body perceptions (those that affect
the head-trunk region) from the more commonly reported illusory own body perceptions that affect the contralesional upper
extremity and discuss their underlying neural correlates, (2) propose that they share aspects with certain cases of somato-
paraphrenia and visual illusory own body perceptions, (3) discuss their relevance for the study of bodily self-consciousness,
and (4) highlight contributions of the dorso-medial posterior parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex for the neurobiology of
bodily self-consciousness.
4.1. Illusory own body perceptions: head and trunk versus upper extremity
Compared to most patients with disorders of body representation, the present two patients differ concerning the affected
body part, the size of the affected body surface and their underlying neural correlates. Disorders of body representation are
usually characterized by an alteration in bodily experience that mostly concerns the contralesional upper extremity and are
mostly caused by damage to the right ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex, right inferior parietal cortex, or right temporo-parietal
cortex. Classically, these are the experience of the absence of a body part (Arzy et al., 2006; Critchley, 1953; Frederiks, 1969;
Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952), of body part transformations (Critchley, 1953; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Ionasescu, 1960;
Lippman, 1952), of body part displacement (Lippman, 1952; Nightingale, 1982), of a disconnection of one body part from the
body (Blanke et al., 2003; Lippman, 1952), as well as somatoparaphrenia (Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009) and
supernumerary phantom limbs (Khateb et al., 2009).
A discussion of the present two patients with respect to somatoparaphrenia seems particularly relevant and we will focus
here on this comparison. Somatoparaphrenia is associated with somatosensory and hemiplegic motor deﬁcits of the contrale-
sional (mostly upper) extremity aswell as neglect and resultsmostly from damage to right temporo-parietal cortex and/or the
right insula (Baier & Karnath, 2008). Somatoparaphrenic patients typically misidentify the affected hand as belonging to
somebody else or misidentify another person’s hand as belonging to themselves (Baier & Karnath, 2008; Gerstmann, 1942;
Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). This condition is often considered an important condition to study bodily self-consciousness, especially
concerning self-attribution of the affected extremity. Yet, Blanke andMetzinger (2009) have argued that the aspects of bodily
self-consciousness that are crucial for theconscious self (SL, 1PP, SI) are ratherbasedonglobalbody representations in thebrain.
Yet, as no change in 1PP, SL (the self is experienced as localized within the patient’s body, e.g. head-trunk) and SI (e.g. only the
contralesional hand is not attributed to the self, whereas the patients still do self-identify with their body) is noted in somato-
paraphrenia. Thus, the study of such patients does not allow to study the conscious self as deﬁned by SL, 1PP, SI.
This differed in both present patients who suffered from abnormal self-identiﬁcation. Patient 1 experienced a strange and
disconnected contralesional hemi-body including trunk, neck, head and extremities and patient 2 experienced a disconnec-
tion from his neck, trunk and both lower extremities, that were felt as less present and numb. In addition, patient 1 reported
that the perceptually altered body segments were experienced as invaded by (the body of) another person. Especially the
latter aspect, but also the involvement of the midline body region (that affected the head in patient 1) and the larger exten-
sion of the affected body surface, suggests the presence of a disorder of self-identiﬁcation with the body of the patients at a
more global level than somatoparaphrenia.
These observations of abnormal self-identiﬁcation with one’s own head and/or trunk are reminiscent of earlier clinical
observations in patients with somatoparaphrenia, in whom not only a limb, but also the contralesional hemi-body was
affected (Gerstmann, 1942; Glonning, Jellinger, & Tschabiter, 1963; Hoff & Pötzl, 1935/1988; Lhermitte, 1939; Menninger-
Lerchenthal, 1935; Pötzl, 1925, for reviews see Blanke et al., 2008; Brugger, 2006). Thus, Pötzl (1925; case 1) described a pa-
tient with left-sided hemiplegia who not only claimed that his left arm belonged to an unknown person, as seen in many
patients with somatoparaphrenia, but also that there was another (unseen) person lying in his bed to his left and that this
person tried to push him out of the bed. Engerth and Hoff (1929) described a 71 year-old man with left-sided hypoesthesia,
hemianopia (with hemianopic hallucinations), and anososognosia who experienced a constant left-sided person who was
most often localized next or behind the patient. Biancone described a 72 year-old female patient with left-sided hemiplegia
and hemianesthesia that claimed that her left hemi-body belonged to another person that was lying in her bed (quoted after
Lhermitte, 1939). In some rare cases, the body of the felt other is even experienced as invading the patient’s body, as noted by
patient 1. Thus, a patient with a parasagittal meningioma adjacent to the right posterior parietal cortex reported by
Nightingale (1982) described that his left hemi-body felt strange, seemed to have shifted backwards and was invaded
(and controlled) by external agents (mostly the patient’s father). Another patient reported by Gloning (1963, case 1) also re-
ported that her left hemi-body felt strange compared to her right hemi-body and was shifted backwards, due to a glioma in
right posterior occipito-parietal cortex. These reports point to the importance of the right posterior and medial parietal
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region making self-identiﬁcation and self-other distinction more ambiguous. We also note that perceptual aberrations
and abnormal self-identiﬁcation of these patients and patient 1 are also comparable to some patients suffering from heau-
toscopy and the feeling of a presence (for review, see Blanke et al., 2008) that may be associated with an experienced split of
the trunk and/or head (e.g. Blanke et al., 2008; Brugger, Blanke, Regard, Bradford, & Landis, 2006). Finally there might also be
a partial overlap with the concept of ego-pathology as described by Scharfetter (1981), which has mainly been applied to
psychiatric patients.
4.2. Self-identiﬁcation and neural full-body representation
Here, we argue that disturbances in self-identiﬁcation and perceptual aberrations with respect to the head and/or trunk
region are observed when head and/or trunk representations in medio-dorsal parietal or prefrontal cortex are affected. This
contrasts functionally and anatomically with damage to more ventro-lateral regions in parietal and prefrontal cortex that are
more typically lesioned in patients with perceptual aberrations affecting a certain body part (Arzy et al., 2006; Berti et al.,
2005; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952). This dissociation between head and trunk versus arm and hand is compatible with
the major functional properties of single neurons in posterior parietal cortex. Neurons in primary somatosensory cortex
(for example area 3b) have small tactile receptive ﬁelds that respond preferentially or only to stimuli applied to a speciﬁc
and contralateral body part (such as the ﬁnger tip or the toe (Gardner, 1988). Neurons in area 1 and 2 have larger receptive
ﬁelds and respond to stimuli applied to one hand or foot and neurons in unimodal somatosensory association cortex (area 5;
(Taoka, Toda, Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 2000) have even larger receptive ﬁelds responding to cutaneous stimuli applied to
proximal parts of an extremity or the trunk. Yet, neurons with somatosensory receptive ﬁelds that encode the hemi-body
or the entire body (global somatosensory receptive ﬁelds) have also been described in the ventral intraparietal region
(VIP). These neurons respond to and encode preferentially the head and trunk region, but may encode also the left or right
hemi-body, the upper or lower hemi-body, or the entire body surface (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1991, 1998). These VIP
neurons have not only large somatosensory receptive ﬁelds, but also large visual receptive ﬁelds, and contain many bimodal
neurons integrating visual and somatosensory stimuli (Bremmer, Klam, Duhamel, Ben Hamed, & Graf, 2002; Duhamel et al.,
1998; Schlack, Hoffmann, & Bremmer, 2002). VIP in humans has been suggested to be localized in the intraparietal sulcus
(Bremmer et al., 2001) and thus overlaps with the regions affected in patient 1. Cells with similar functional properties
are likely to exist in premotor cortex and the SMA (Graziano, 1999; Penﬁeld & Jasper, 1954). We therefore speculate that
processing of VIP in patient 1 and premotor cortex and SMA (and adjacent regions with similar functional properties) in pa-
tient 2 was abnormal and gave rise to disturbances in self-identiﬁcation and perceptual aberrations affecting head and/or
trunk and thus full body representations.
4.3. Cognitive neuroscience of bodily self-consciousness
The data in patient 2 may further be of relevance for the neurobiology of depersonalization, as he also reported a
non-perceptual detachment of the self and loss of self-relevance. Patients suffering from depersonalization often feel
detached and alienated from their body and/or mental processes, feeling as an outside ‘‘observer”, while having no or less
control over their actions (DSM-IV., 2000). Although somewhat reminiscent of autoscopic phenomena, such as out-of-body
experience or heautoscopy (Brugger, 2002), there is generally no experienced perceptual change in 1PP or in SL in patients
with depersonalization. Interestingly, a recent model regarding the neurobiological correlates of depersonalization suggests
an involvement of the prefrontal cortex (Sierra & Berrios, 1998) proposing that increased prefrontal activity may lead to lim-
bic inhibition that results in decreased autonomic output and hypo-emotionality towards the self and the world. Together
with neuroimaging data showing the medial prefrontal cortex’s role in cognitive aspects of self-related processing (Northoff
et al., 2006), its recruitment during behavioral tasks demanding imagined perspective transformations (Vogeley & Fink,
2003), it may be suggested that activity in the medial prefrontal cortex may reﬂect more cognitive than spatial aspects of
the 1PP, including self reference, self concept and a mental representation of oneself as a subject of experience that may
be disturbed in patients with depersonalization.
Although bodily self-consciousness and its three components, SI, 1PP, and SL, have been linked to multisensory
integration at the temporo-parietal junction, careful study of patients with depersonalization as well as patients with disor-
ders of body representation affecting the head and/or trunk region may provide additional insights into the neurobiology of
selfhood. Such self-related brain activity is likely to be distributed in a network of brain regions including the temporo-
parietal junction, the dorso-medial parietal cortex, the prefrontal cortex and the default network (Ehrsson, Spence, &
Passingham, 2004; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Hanakawa et al., 2003; Kircher et al., 2000; Macrae, Moran,
Heatherton, Banﬁeld, & Kelley, 2004; Maguire et al., 1998; Northoff et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Vogeley & Fink, 2003).
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